AD CS Certificate and Security Configuration Exploits

Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) is a huge security feature in the cybersecurity landscape as it provides an infrastructure for managing certificates within an organization. At the heart of AD CS Server lies the Public/ Key Infrastructure (PKI), which uses pairs of public and private keys to enable secure communication. Combined with algorithms and key lengths, these keys form the basis for data encryption techniques that safeguard information by maintaining its confidentiality and integrity, enhancing the safety of user authentication. 

To incorporate this highly secure network feature for enterprise environments, domain administrators must have a strong understanding of AD CS, and it issues digital certificates governed by templates. These templates determine which certificate a domain user or machine client will receive for authenticated network access and the level of access to server-based resources. Which domain users receive which type of certificate? This will enable certificate-based authentication that authenticated users can use to access their enterprise’s resources with 802.1x protocols.

Unfortunately, it is often mismanaged as the complexity of maintaining and operating PKI infrastructure can be improperly configured when starting the service. d as most domain admins are Weak or misconfigured, AD CS instances are typically more about finding the right combination of settings that allows different systems and services to utilize the PKI while adhering to principles like least privilege and separation of duties. Frequently, it’s just easier to provide more permissions than are necessary because it’s easier than completing troubleshooting or managing things in a tightly controlled manner. Unaware of these security feature vulnerabilities due to the complex management and understanding of vulnerable certificate templates that can lead to misconfigured certificate service instances. It is unaware that these instances can lead to various opportunities for AD CS attacks that can compromise that enterprise’s entire AD CS System. 

In this article, we will cover all vulnerabilities an enterprise’s domain admin may encounter or currently faces using Microsoft’s PKI implementation when using an Enterprise Certificate Authority uncovered by the cyber security organization Specterops. These vulnerabilities could lead to Certificate Theft, Account Persistence, Domain Persistence, and Domain Escalation attacks. There’s a lot of information to cover. Important AD CS Components

Below are the components that make up a Public Key Infrastructure and X.509 Digital Certificate that administrators would deploy for authentication, messaging signing, and encryption. Please use this section as a reference when reading the passages to understand better which component is being affected. 

• Basic Constraints – Specifies if there are any constraints and if the certificate is an end entity or Certificate Authority. 

• CA(Certificate Authority) – Certificate Authorities are responsible for issuing certificates and managing the validity of the certificates. Certificates can be issued by either Root or Subordinate Certificate Authority.

•  Certificate Signing Request (CSR) – An encrypted message sent from the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Digital Certificate requestee to the Domain Certificate Authority(CA). The CSR will validate whether the information the CA requires is valid.
• DPAPI – The Windows Data Protection API is a way for the Windows Operating System to perform symmetric encryption or asymmetric private keys. This allows the current user account or computer to encrypt its data without creating and storing certificate private keys. 

• DPAPI Masterkeys – These are used to encrypt the user’s RSA key. This is stored in the same file as the master key that protects the user’s private keys.

• Extended Key Usages (EKUs) – These are Object Identifiers (OID) that describe how the certificate will be intended to be used. This can also be referred to as Enhanced Key Usage.
  • OID:
    • Client Authentication
    • Code Signing
    • Encrypting File System
    • Secure Email
    • Smart Card Logon

• Issuer – The name of the CA that issues certificates. The Issuer and Subject are the same for root CAs.

• Masterkey – The key the client and server use for all session key generation. The master key generates the client-read key, the client-write key, the server-read key, and the server-write key. Master keys can be exported as simple key BLOBs.

• NotBefore and NotAfter dates – Also known as the validity Period, this specifies the duration of the certificate’s validity.

• Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication (PKNIT)- This service allows Network Authentication Services to run a Key Distribution Center (KDC) on multiple OSs to use PKI in the Authentication Service exchange.  The two methods of encrypting the response to a client are the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Method and the Public Key Encryption RSA Method. 

• Public Key – This associates the Subject with a private key stored separately.

• Public and Private Key -. The core of the Public Key Infrastructure(PKI).  This long string of bits is used to encrypt and decrypt data during transmission. The public key is available to anyone who requests it and is issued by a trusted certificate authority. The public key verifies and authenticates the sender of the encrypted message. The private, or secret key, is kept confidential by the recipient of the encrypted message and used to decrypt the transmission so that only the recipient can open and read it. 

• Root CA – The core CA that functions at the start of the chain of trust in a PKI. This will sign the certificates for Subordinate CAs, authorizing them to Issue Certificates on their own. 

• Subject – Here, you can enter the name of the user/device to which the CA issues the certificate. Most organizations use this to store the certificate Common Name, which is almost always the user’s email address.

• Serial Number – This is an identifier that the Certificate Authority assigns. 

• Subject AlternativeName – Defines the alternative names that the Subject may go by. 

• Signature Algorithm – The algorithm that is used to sign the private key. This is usually RSA 2048

• Signature – This is the identity for the Signature Algorithm used by the Certificate Authority to sign the certificate.  

• Subordinate CA – This Certificate Authority is certified by another CA. 

AD CS Attacks

Active Directory Certificate Service attacks are caused by the misconfiguration of certificate templates and AD CS Server settings. These weak spots can be found within the enterprise PKI Design, specifically, the enterprise root, enterprise subordinate, certificate templates, and auto-enrollment CA (Certificate Authority) CA Settings, leading to various attacks.  It’s essential to be aware of these misconfigurations because this can lead to your domain  Certificate Authority being compromised, allowing the attacker to take control and operate as the organization’s CA, giving them complete access to all of the enterprise’s resources. 

The attacker’s goal will be to gain the same privileged access rights as a domain admin user and gain control over that organization’s network and its domain users’ group information. They’ll be searching for weak points such as weak certificate mappings, a vulnerable web enrollment endpoint to take control of the domain controller, and creating arbitrary certificate values to access the domain administrator account of the Active Directory Environments. We’ll cover the types of attacks that the hacker will use and the different methods of offense for these attacks, starting with Certificate Theft.  

Certificate Theft

The theft of certificates is a significant concern when it comes to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS). Attackers who want to compromise the confidentiality and integrity of communication can exploit vulnerabilities to steal certificates. By getting hold of certificates, they can pretend to be authorized users, which leads to access and potential data breaches. The impact of certificate theft goes beyond breaches since compromised certificates can be used for some time, making it difficult to detect and fix the issue. In this passage, we will cover the four different methods of certificate theft.

Using Crypto API to Export Certificates

Using Interactive desktop sessions is the easiest way for a hacker to extract the user or machine certificate with the private key. If that domain PC has an exportable private key, an attacker can remove it within that interactive desktop session by clicking on the certificate and exporting the .pfx file.  

Extraction of User and Machine Certificates via DPAPI

Windows stores certificate private keys through DPAPI for user and machine certificates. User certificates are most commonly stored in HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates, and machine certificates are widely stored in HKEY_LOCAL_Machine\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates. The machine keeps personal certificates in the directory. %APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\My\Certificates\. API private keys are stored in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\User SID\, for CNG Keys, they’re stored in %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\. This shows that the DPAPI Master Key is required for decryption of the private key protection blob and determines the name of the user or machine master key identified via the GUID to decrypt the private key. 

To gain possession of a user certificate and its associated private key, the hacker will identify which user’s certificate would be the most beneficial to extract, locate the DPAPI Master Key, and obtain the plaintext DPAPI Master Key to use it to decrypt the private key. However, To gain possession of the Machine Certificate, the hacker will use the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret on the system. Attackers cannot decrypt the domain’s DPAPI Master Keys with the domain’s DPAPI backup key; only the SYSTEM user can access the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSAsecret. 

Locating Certificate FIles

Attackers will try to locate certificate files by searching in the downloads folder or Share Mining files, which is the best way to search for data. Using the seatbelt command within Windows Powershell, “dir C:\ 10\.(pfx|pem\p12)’ $ false”, you can locate certificate files. File extensions containing just the private key are  .key; extensions with just the certificate are .crt or .cer. Hackers may also search for the certificate signing request file, .csr, containing information about your domain, service, organization, and website. Finally, Java Keystore may include private keys and certificates used by Java applications. The file extensions that would be searched for are .jks/ .keystore/ .keys.

Using PKINIT to Expose NTLM Credential Theft Vulnerability 

When certificates and PKINIT, a component of Microsoft’s Kerberos PKINIT specification, are misused, attackers gain an advantage: theft of NTLM credentials. Within Microsoft’s PKINIT specification, there is a provision that states if someone employs PKINIT to obtain a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and successfully authenticates, a contingency plan exists. 

In cases where the user needs to connect to services that do not support authentication, the Key Distribution Center (KDC) returns the user’s NTLM hash within a specialized package known as the Privilege Attribute Certificate (PAC).

Decrypting this package involves working with a structure called PAC_CREDENTIAL_DATA, which represents the format of the NTLM plaintext. Additionally, Kekeo can handle smartcard-protected certificates if one possesses the smartcard PIN.

Thus, if an attacker combines their retrieval of NTLM hashes with stealing the root certificate from an Active Directory Certificate Authority (AD CA), they can fabricate certificates for any user or computer. By utilizing these forged certificates, they can gain access. Obtain current NTLM plaintext for targeted users or computers.

Account Persistence

Maintaining Account Persistence after gaining access is challenging in the AD CS environment. Once attackers gain entry through certificate theft, they strive to stay undetected in the system. They use techniques to persist in their presence, allowing them to maintain control and potentially engage in malicious activities. This persistence can take the form of manipulating user accounts or creating accounts without authorization, building a presence that complicates security measures. To gain Account Persistence, attackers will have acquired Active User Credential Theft through Certificates, Machine Persistence Through Certificates, and Account Persistence gained through Certificate Renewal.

Active User Credential Theft Through Certificates

A method of Account Persistence is Active User Credential Theft Through Certificates. This occurs when an organization has its Certificate Authority (CA). Individuals can request a certificate for purposes such as authenticating to Active Directory. To do this, they need to meet the criteria for the certificate template, including being eligible for enrollment, allowing certain groups to enroll, and having Extended Key Usages (EKUs).

One used template for this purpose is the User template. However, in some cases, it might be inactive or unavailable. To find available templates that meet the required criteria, the hacker will use command line tools to scan the  LDAP Directory (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) for templates that match the requirements. An attacker could exploit a suitable template by requesting that specific certificate if a suitable template is discovered. The issued certificate would allow them to authenticate themselves as long as it remains valid even if the user changes their password.

Specific templates may have rights called “Enrollment Principals.” When using command line tools,  these principles can be revealed. If an attacker gains control over a principal with enrollment privileges for a template, they could exploit this situation. If you can access a host’s graphical user interface (GUI), you can manually request a certificate using certmgr.ms or command line tools. 

Once the hacker has obtained a certificate, they can convert it into a compatible format. This converted certificate can then be used to request a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) for the enrolled user as the certificate remains valid (usually for one year).

It’s important to note that these certificates can still be utilized even if the user changes their password. Combining them with techniques mentioned in sections allows an attacker to commit long-term credential theft without needing access to specific sensitive system components.

Machine Persistence Through Certificates 

Machine accounts are a type of user account. If machine certificate templates are configured to allow Domain Computers to be the enrollment principal, an attacker could exploit it to enroll the compromised systems’ machine account. The default Machine template already possesses the attributes for this purpose.

When an attacker obtains privileges on a compromised system, they can utilize the SYSTEM account to enroll in certificate templates that grant enrollment privileges to machine accounts. 

With a machine account certificate, the attacker can authenticate themselves as the machine account within Kerberos. By employing S4U2Self, they can acquire a Kerberos service ticket for any service on the host (CIFS, HTTP, RPCSS) as any user. 

Essentially, this grants the attacker a means of maintaining persistence on the machine for as long as the certificate template remains valid ( one year). This persistence method remains effective when the system updates its password (as it typically does every 30 days), withstands a system wipe (provided that the same machine account name is used afterward Or could potentially be restored by renaming a computer or adding a computer with the same name.), and does not necessitate any modifications to the operating system or it could potentially be restored by renaming a computer or adding a computer with the same name.

Certificate Renewal 

Certificate templates usually include a designated “Validity Period,” determining how long an issued certificate remains valid. Additionally, there is a “Renewal Period” that typically lasts for six weeks. During this Renewal Period, account holders can manually renew their certificates before they expire.

Suppose an attacker gains access to a domain authentication certificate through theft or exploiting vulnerabilities. In that case, they can use it to authenticate themselves to Active Directory (AD) for the certificate’s validity period. What’s intriguing is that the attacker can even renew the certificate before it expires, granting them access to AD without raising any security alarms.

From a security perspective, AD Certificate Services (AD CS) is not inherently insecure. However, like any system, it can become susceptible to vulnerabilities if not correctly configured and maintained. Organizations should prioritize setting up and maintaining AD CS effectively to protect their environment.

Domain Escalation 

Domain Escalation is an attack against AD CS caused by misconfigured certificate templates. After gaining access and establishing account persistence, adversaries often aim to elevate their privileges within the domain. Misconfigured certificate templates play a role in this phase, allowing attackers to exploit vulnerabilities and gain levels of access. Domain Escalation can result in control over infrastructure, potentially compromising the overall security of the entire network. In the following section, we will cover all eight attack methods in order of the most popular methods. 

Misconfigured Certificate Templates Configuration 

Misconfigured certificate templates are one of the biggest causes of Domain Escalation among organizations. When configuring certificates, administrators must be very mindful of the selected attributes for their templates; if not, they will put their enterprise and all users on their domain at risk for Domain Escalation.

Administrators should know three scenarios of vulnerable certificate templates when setting their configurations. 

ESC1 

• Enterprise CA provides Enrollment Rights to Low-Privileged Users.

• The Manager Approval Setting  is not enabled
• Not Requiring the Use of Authorized Signatures for CSR

• The Security Descriptor that is too permissive gives certificate enrollment privileges to Low-Levels.

The first scenario’s misconfigured certificate template allows the attacker to request a certificate using an arbitrary SAN (Subject Alternative Name/ subjectAltName). It will allow the malicious hacker to authenticate as any principle with low user privileges using SChannel or Kerberos.  This can occur because the Certificate Template will enable requesters to specify a SAN in the CSR (Certificate Signing Request) and define which EKUs (Extended Key Usage) will allow authentication. This includes EKUs such as Smart Card logon, Client Authentication, PKINIT Client Authentication, and any purpose or no Extended Key Usage/Sub CA.

Active Directory will use the identity specified by Certificates SAN during authentication, which allows the hacker to identify the SAN in the CSR. Knowing this, the attacker will then be able to request certificates as any user under the Active Directory environment, which includes the domain administrator, making this the most significant weak point.

ESC2

• Enterprise CA provides Enrollment Rights to Low-Privileged Users
• The Manager Approval Setting  is not enabled
• Not Requiring the Use of Authorized Signatures for CSR
• The Security Descriptor that is too permissive gives certificate enrollment privileges to Low-Levels 
• The Template defines no or Any purpose EKU

The second scenario has misconfigurations similar to the first, but the certificate template defines the Any Purpose or no EKU, allowing the hacker to authenticate to the Active Directory. The Any Purpose EKU enables the attacker to perform any authentication, such as server and client authentication. This can also lead to the attacker using the no EKU template/ a SubCA certificate to sign new certificates to specify an arbitrary EKU or fields within the new certificates.  

ESC3 

The third scenario of misconfigured certificate templates requires an extra step from the above vulnerable certificate template conditions. Two circumstances would cause Domain Escalation. 

Circumstance 1

• Enterprise CA provides Enrollment Rights to Low-Privileged Users
• The Manager Approval Setting  is not enabled
• Not Requiring the Use of Authorized Signatures for CSR
• The Security Descriptor that is too permissive gives certificate enrollment privileges to Low-Levels 
• The template, on behalf of other principles, specifies the Certificate Request Agent EKU

Circumstance 2

• Enterprise CA provides Enrollment Rights to Low-Privileged Users
• The Manager Approval Setting  is not enabled
• Enrollment Agent Restrictions are not enforced within the CA 
• The Template Specifies that an EKU that enables Domain Authentication 
• The Template Composition of Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 distinguishes an Application Policy Issuance Requirement Requiring CR Agent EKU

The hacker can abuse certificate templates in this scenario by recognizing the Certificate Request Agent EKU vulnerability. This EKU allows a principal to enroll for a certificate on behalf of another user.  This can lead to privilege escalation for the attacker because the enrollment agent will register the hacker in a template that uses the certificate to co-sign a Certificate Signing Request on behalf of that hacker. After cosigning, the Certificate Signing Request will then be sent to the Certificate Authority with the requested certificate and enroll it with the template that permits “enroll on behalf of..” showing the certificate belonging to the other user, which will most likely be a domain admin.

Even if this configuration of Certificate Authority can be set to “Restrict Enrollment Agents,” this default setting is very permissive, and it allows anybody on the domain to access and enroll in all templates as anybody within the Active Directory Environment to achieve domain administrator privileges.  

ESC 8: NTLM Relay to AD CS HTTP Endpoints

HTTP-based certificates are vulnerable to Domain Escalation through NTLM Relay attacks. These attacks can occur because of the combination of a certificate template that has been published that allows domain computer enrollment and client authentication and the HTTP-based Certificate enrollment endpoints not having their NTLM Relay protections enabled. These attacks are perpetrated by a hacker using a compromised machine to impersonate any inbound NTLM-authenticating Active Directory account. After gaining access to the account, the hacker will begin to interface with web interfaces to request client authentication certificates depending on the user or machine certificate template that will allow the attacker more access within the system. 

This domain escalation scenario comes with its limitations. The attacker has a short time window for abusing the Certificate because of a Privileged Account in AD ( Active Directory). After relaying the inbound authentication, the account can only authenticate once to the hackers’ machine.  Attackers get around these limitations by forwarding the inbound authentication to the AD CS interfaces instead and requesting a client authentication certificate portraying as the victim’s account. They can then authenticate using Kerberos, Schannel, or PKNIT to gain the privileged NTLM hash. By doing so, the attacker will achieve access to the victim account for the length of the certificate validity to the domain and will be able to authenticate to any provided service through multiple authentication protocols without interference from NTLM Signing.  

Another limitation Attackers will face is the requirement of the target account to authenticate to the attacker’s possessed machine.  This can be sidestepped in two different ways. The Hacker can either wait for the target to sign into the machine or coerce an account to authenticate to the compromised machine using “ The Printer Bug” technique. This portrays a machine account requesting a Client Authentication Certificate-based template as that target machine’s account using its machine certificate. This could lead to the hacker carrying out privileged actions like domain replication if that account were to have Privileged Access. Another technique that the attacker may use is the S4U2Self to gain access to the target machine’s host OS or PKINIT to receive the NT hash and create a forged Kerberos Service Ticket. 

An organization must audit its PCs and certificate templates, as scenarios of Domain Escalation can affect any computer running the spooler service. Once the vulnerabilities within the domain are determined, it’ll only be a matter of time until the hacker achieves access to the domain network. 

ESC 4: Vulnerable Certificate Template Access Control

Access Control Entries that enable unprivileged AD principals to configure sensible security settings within the certificate templates can lead to a Domain Escalation attack. This is caused by the attacker recognizing the  AD principal’s specific permission within the securable object in AD or the certificate templates. The attacker will then begin an attack focusing on chain access, searching for a domain computer with permissions over a Certificate Template’s AD object. Eventually, this leads to a point where they can push a misconfiguration vulnerability to a certificate template established previously as secured. This misconfiguration can be done by enabling the flag msPKI-certificate-name-flag, allowing domain authentication.  

ESC 5: Vulnerable PKI Object Access Control 

Outside of certificate templates, several vulnerabilities from ACL-based relationships can lead to attacks, ending with the hacker gaining control of the enterprise PKI infrastructure and escalating the domain privileges.  These vulnerabilities that should be monitored are the CA server’s RPC/DCOM server, the CA server’s AD computer object, and descendent containers/AD Objects like the Certificate Templates container, NTAuthCertificate Object, The Enrollment Services Container, and more. 

ESC 6: Vulnerability within the User SAN( Subject Alternative Name) Syntax

This vulnerability allows an attacker to enroll with any certificate template configured for domain authentication and allows unprivileged users to register.  This is caused by the flag set on the CA with the setting attribute EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2. 

Check whether this is enabled within your AD CS settings using the certutil.exe command certutil -config “CA_HOST\CA_NAME” -setreg “policy\EditFlags.” 

ESC 7: Vulnerable Certificate Authority Access Control

The certificate authority secures CA actions through a set of permissions. You can view these permissions by clicking start, run, and typing in certsrv.msc, right-click on the CA select properties, then choose the Security tab or view it within Windows Powershell using “Get-CertificationAuthority | Get-CertificationAuthorityAcl.” Within Windows Powershell, the two settings that control Certificate Authority Access Control are CA Administrator and Certificate Manager, also known as ManageCA and ManageCertificates rights. Suppose the attacker can possess a principal with ManageCA rights or set the CA’s persisted configuration data using Config_CA_Accept_Request_Attribues_SAN. This can lead to a vulnerability within the User SAN using PSPKI to remotely access and configure the setting attribute EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2. 

Domain Persistence

Domain persistence represents the culmination of account persistence and Domain Escalation. It signifies establishing a long-term presence within the AD CS environment, enabling attackers to maintain control and continue their activities over a period. Achieving domain persistence allows enterprise adversaries to adapt to evolving security measures, making it increasingly challenging to detect and mitigate their actions. To perform Domain Persistence, attackers will forge stolen Certificate Authorities, deceive a user into trusting a rogue CA, and maliciously misconfigure AD CS’s security services. 

Forging Certificates with Stolen CA certificates

The Certificate Authority (CA) holds a certificate and private key on its server in an organization. It’s common for Enterprise CAs to be hosted on servers separate from domain controllers; shockingly, they often receive a different level of protection than a tier 0 asset. Only sometimes receive the level of security.

To identify the CA certificate, you can look for these characteristics. The certificate is located on the CA server, and the machine DPAPI safeguards its private key unless hardware protection is utilized. Both the Issuer and Subject fields of the certificate are set to the name of the CA. If an unauthorized individual gains control over the CA server, they could extract the private key to enable them to generate a.pfx file that could be utilized for forging certificates. This forged certificate can then be employed for authentication purposes to gain access to systems.

The forged certificate remains valid until its specified end date, as the root CA certificate remains valid. It’s important to note that this exploitation isn’t restricted solely to user accounts; it can also apply to machine accounts.

Furthermore, because the fraudulent certificate is not included in the issuance procedure, the Certificate Authority (CA) cannot revoke it. This approach enables attackers to maintain their presence on domain machines for as long as the CA certificate remains legitimate. It is essential to highlight that this method circumvents revocation procedures since the CA does not know of the existence of the forged certificate.

Trusting Rouge CA Certificates 

In Kerberos authentication, an object known as NTAuthCertificates holds one or more Certificate Authority Certificates. During the authentication process, the domain controller verifies whether the NTAuthCertificates object contains a certificate from the CA as the user’s authenticating certificate. If a match is found, authentication proceeds; otherwise, it fails.

However, an attacker may attempt to exploit this system by employing methods to forge certificates. For instance, they might generate a self-signed CA certificate. Surreptitiously insert it into the NTAuthCertificates object. This attack is only possible if the attacker controls the NTAuthCertificates object itself. It typically requires high-level privileges like those held by members of the Enterprise Admin group or Domain Admins. 

Despite these tactics, attackers often find stealing an existing CA certificate simpler than introducing a fraudulent one. Stealing an existing certificate is a straightforward and practical approach for malicious individuals.

Malicious Misconfiguration 

Attackers have numerous opportunities to maintain access through security setting changes regarding AD Certificate Services (AD CS). This includes making malicious modifications to various components like the CA server’s computer object, RPC/DCOM server, different AD objects or containers related to Public Key Services, and AD groups with specific rights associated with AD CS.

For instance, attackers with high-level access could give themselves special permissions on the default User certificate template. By doing this, they could later modify the template to provide ownership to themselves. This ownership change allows them to manipulate specific settings, creating certificates that impersonate high-level users, like a domain administrator. The challenge for organizations is that they currently need an effective way to monitor and audit permissions related to certificate services. 

Conclusion

While AD CS offers benefits in enhancing security with certificates, it should be considered due to its complexity and potential security risks. Regular maintenance, diligent monitoring, and a comprehensive understanding of associated risks are essential. Administrators maintaining AD CS will undoubtedly be faced with a complex and time-focused 

To ensure secure communication and data protection, organizations must adopt an approach toward security measures when relying on AD CS. Understanding AD CS and its potential risks is crucial to fully utilize its advantages while mitigating security vulnerabilities. Otherwise, organizations may face the consequences of receiving highly costly damage. One of the most significant ways to reduce an enterprise risk that Microsoft also recommends is to have your network device enrollment service managed by a third party specializing in Public Key Encryption. This creates a massive advantage for enterprises and IT administrators by having the cost, complexity, and maintenance required to run a PKI infrastructure delegated to an organization solely focused on ensuring its security and functioning performance.  If you want more information regarding a third-party specialist, please look at the SecureW2 homepage and contact us for more information regarding securing your network.